Alert rules already auto-migrate into automations on boot and the old
engine stands down after. Deletes the rule/firing tables, routes, UI,
and AI tools; keeps notification channels since automations still use
them. Also fixes automations' notify step, which still called the
deleted repository.
Repoints core consumers (dispatcher, collab, session-sharing, tab
utils) at the plugin, adds isTabTypeAvailable gating for rdp/vnc/
telnet, widens hostCapability to accept an array, and renames the
guacamole i18n namespace to remoteDesktop.
Moves src/backend/ai and its routes into plugins/ai, mounted through a
small /ai dispatcher instead of its own port. Moves the ai-enabled and
ai-private-endpoints settings routes out of user-settings-routes.ts
into the plugin too, so it has no leftover core dependents.
Require auth on /plugin-api, gate plugin enable/grant/revoke routes
behind admin.plugins.manage, and thread the calling user through
worker ctx.hosts/ctx.ssh calls instead of always using the install
owner. Also adds the plugin permissions grant/revoke UI.
Moves docker backend and frontend into plugins/docker/, alongside
ssh-terminal. Adds a host editor tab seam, a dashboard card registry,
and a build step to compile plugin backends into dist.
The test still asserted transferToHost was called with the destination
directory "/srv". Commit 7727fa09 (#1304) deliberately changed a single
file transfer to send the full destination path including the filename,
so the correct expectation is "/srv/remote-1.txt". The code was right
and the test was left behind.
ctx.http.route now registers a real router on the /plugin-api/:pluginId
dispatcher, replacing its stub 404. A plugin never touches the Express
req/res: it gets a plain summary and returns a plain object, so sockets
and session cookies stay on this side of the boundary. Authorization and
cookie headers are not forwarded.
Plugins load last in the start-up sequence, after the server is fully
wired, and are terminated before the database on shutdown so none can
outlive it. A plugin that fails to load cannot stop the backend.
fix: correct the nginx plugin-api location regex
The pattern was ^/plugin-api/(/.*)?$, which needs a double slash and so
never matched /plugin-api/<id>/<route>. Every other block in the file
uses ^/prefix(/.*)?$. Left alone, plugin routes would work in dev and
404 only behind Docker.
Every ctx call a plugin makes is checked against its granted
capabilities, performed by the main thread, then audited. A capability
must be both declared in the manifest and granted in the database, so
widening a plugin's reach always needs a new manifest the user can see,
never just a database row.
Audit attribution is set by the broker, not the plugin. The plugin
supplies only the details, so it cannot forge the actor.
fix: stop plugin workers seeing plaintext credentials in error messages
A failing ctx.ssh.connect handed the worker the raw error from deep in
the SSH stack, which embeds the connect config. The worker received, in
full:
Authentication failed for root using password <SECRET>
where <SECRET> was the host's real plaintext password. Any plugin with
ssh.exec could read it by catching the error, defeating the whole point
of the handle-based ssh API.
Errors crossing the boundary are now sanitised. Only PluginFacingError
and PluginPermissionError, both authored here, reach a plugin verbatim;
anything else becomes a generic message and the real one goes to the
log. This uses a marker class rather than matching on message text,
because matching would start leaking again the moment an upstream error
happened to contain a familiar phrase.
Covered by credential-isolation.test.ts, which plants a sentinel in
every secret-bearing field and asserts it appears in no message the
worker ever receives.
LukeGus