Files
Termix/packages/plugin-sdk/src/backend.ts
T

3168 lines
106 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* The backend contract: what a plugin's activate(ctx) receives.
*
* These are types only. Core builds the real object in
* src/backend/plugins/ctx.ts and injects it at activation, so the SDK stays a
* description of the contract rather than an implementation a plugin could
* reach around.
*
* ctx.ssh is the part of step B's host surface that A8 needed early, so plugin
* transports could leave core's internals behind.
*/
import type { HostSshOptions } from "./ssh-options.js";
export type { HostSshOptions } from "./ssh-options.js";
import type { PluginManifest, PluginSettingsField } from "./manifest.js";
import type { PluginTableDefinition } from "./db.js";
/**
* Thrown when a plugin calls a guarded member without the capability.
*
* Two things must be true: the manifest declares it, and it is granted. A
* grant for something the manifest never declared is ignored, so widening a
* plugin's reach always needs a new manifest the user can see.
*/
export class PluginCapabilityError extends Error {
readonly code = "EPLUGINCAP";
readonly pluginId: string;
readonly capability: string;
constructor(pluginId: string, capability: string) {
super(
`Plugin "${pluginId}" is not granted the "${capability}" capability. ` +
`Declare it in the manifest's capabilities array and grant it in the plugin's settings.`,
);
this.name = "PluginCapabilityError";
this.pluginId = pluginId;
this.capability = capability;
}
}
/**
* Thrown by a login method or second factor to refuse a sign-in with a
* message the user can see. `code` is a stable id the login screen can map to
* its own text; `status` is the HTTP status for form methods.
*/
export class LoginMethodError extends Error {
readonly status: number;
readonly code?: string;
constructor(message: string, status = 401, code?: string) {
super(message);
this.name = "LoginMethodError";
this.status = status;
this.code = code;
}
}
export interface PluginLogger {
debug: (message: string) => void;
info: (message: string) => void;
warn: (message: string) => void;
error: (message: string, error?: Error) => void;
}
export interface PluginEvents {
/** Topics are namespaced to plugin.<id>.* unless the plugin holds events:core. */
emit: (topic: string, payload: unknown) => void;
on: (topic: string, listener: (payload: unknown) => void) => () => void;
}
/** Small key/value state owned by this plugin. Requires kv:own. */
export interface PluginKeyValue {
get: (key: string) => Promise<unknown>;
set: (key: string, value: unknown) => Promise<void>;
delete: (key: string) => Promise<boolean>;
list: () => Promise<string[]>;
}
/**
* A folder on disk this plugin owns, for state too large for ctx.kv (session
* recordings, uploaded files). Requires files:own.
*/
export interface PluginFiles {
/**
* The plugin's own folder under DATA_DIR, created if it does not exist yet.
* Always the same path for this plugin; a plugin lays out its own
* subdirectories underneath it.
*/
dataDir: () => Promise<string>;
}
/**
* The plugin's own tables.
*
* `define` registers a table definition and returns the Drizzle table object
* to query through `db`. Both require db:own.
*
* Scoped by name: every table carries the p_<id>_ prefix, and `refs` exposes
* users, ssh_data, roles and user_roles (behind db:core-refs) so a plugin can
* join against them. In-process code could reach around
* all of this. The capability, the prefix, lint and review are the contract,
* not a sandbox.
*/
export interface PluginDatabase {
/** Registers a definition and returns its queryable table object. */
define: <T = unknown>(definition: PluginTableDefinition) => Promise<T>;
/** Drizzle handle, scoped to this plugin's tables. */
client: <T = unknown>() => Promise<T>;
/**
* Core tables a plugin may join against: users, hosts, roles, userRoles.
* Needs db:core-refs. Treat them as read-only.
*/
refs: <T = unknown>() => Promise<T>;
/**
* Flushes writes to disk. Call it after every write: on SQLite the database
* lives in memory and is saved to its encrypted file only when asked, so a
* write without it can be lost on restart. A no-op on Postgres and MySQL.
*/
persist: (options?: {
/**
* Mark the database dirty and let the debounced save pick it up, rather
* than saving now. For frequent, low-value writes such as samples, where
* losing a couple of seconds on a crash is fine.
*/
lazy?: boolean;
}) => Promise<void>;
/**
* The engine the server runs on. Table objects encode the same on all
* three, but MySQL has no RETURNING, so portable code reads a written row
* back by its key rather than relying on .returning().
*/
readonly dialect: "sqlite" | "postgres" | "mysql";
}
/** A row's shape on the wire, before it is written to a table. */
export type SyncRow = Record<string, unknown>;
export interface SyncEntityReference {
/**
* Where a local numeric id lives. A plain column ("credentialId"), or a
* path into a JSON column: "jumpHosts[].hostId" walks every item of the
* jumpHosts array, "layout.panes[].hostId" walks nested objects. A JSON
* column may be stored as a string or as parsed JSON.
*/
field: string;
/**
* Wire field holding the portable id, e.g. "credentialSyncId". Only for a
* plain column; a JSON path is rewritten in place.
*/
syncField?: string;
/** The entity the id points at. */
entityType: string;
/** How a JSON path stores the local id. Defaults to "number". */
idType?: "number" | "string";
}
export interface SyncEntityPermissions {
/** Checked before a pushed row that does not exist yet is written. */
create?: string;
/** Checked before a pushed change to an existing row is written. */
update?: string;
/** Checked before a pushed delete runs. */
delete?: string;
}
export interface SyncWriteEvent {
/** The local id of the row that was written. */
id: number | null;
userId: string;
/** The row as it arrived, before references were resolved. */
wire: SyncRow;
created: boolean;
/** Another entity's syncId to its local id here, for ids serialize put on the wire. */
resolveId?: (entityType: string, syncId: string) => Promise<number | null>;
}
export interface SyncEntityRegistration {
/** Stable wire name. Never change it: records on both sides match on it. */
type: string;
/** The table, as returned by ctx.db.define. */
table: unknown;
/** Column holding the owning user id. Defaults to "userId". */
userColumn?: string;
/** Fields stored encrypted with the owner's data key. Plaintext on the wire. */
encryptedFields?: readonly string[];
/** Local-id to sync-id translations applied on the way out and back. */
references?: readonly SyncEntityReference[];
/** Lower sorts first. Reference targets must sort before their referrers. */
order?: number;
/**
* Fields that stay on this side: never sent, never overwritten by an
* inbound row, and ignored when deciding whether a row changed.
*/
readOnlyFields?: readonly string[];
/** One row per user rather than many, keyed on the owner. */
singleton?: boolean;
/**
* Names core uses when its own rows point at this entity without knowing
* which plugin provides it. Nothing in core uses one today.
*/
answersTo?: readonly string[];
/**
* Rows this returns false for are left out of sync in both directions, for
* state that belongs to one install (a per-device "last session").
*/
shouldSync?: (row: SyncRow) => boolean;
/** RBAC permissions a pushed change needs on the server. */
permissions?: SyncEntityPermissions;
/**
* Runs after `references` on the way out, for anything they cannot
* express. Gets the row with references already translated.
*/
serialize?: (
row: SyncRow,
resolveSyncId: (entityType: string, id: number) => Promise<string | null>,
) => Promise<SyncRow>;
/** Runs after `references` on the way in. */
deserialize?: (
row: SyncRow,
resolveId: (entityType: string, syncId: string) => Promise<number | null>,
) => Promise<SyncRow>;
/** Runs after a synced row was written on this side. */
afterWrite?: (event: SyncWriteEvent) => Promise<void>;
/**
* Replaces the plain delete of a synced row, for rows with cleanup of their
* own. Gets the stored row.
*/
remove?: (row: SyncRow, userId: string) => Promise<void>;
}
/**
* Adds an entity to sync between a linked desktop and its server.
*
* Deletes need nothing extra: core notices a registered row is gone and
* sends the delete itself.
*/
export interface PluginSync {
registerEntity: (entity: SyncEntityRegistration) => void;
/** Needs sync:provide. Takes over /sync/v2 and /sync/link. Removed on deactivate. */
provide: (provider: PluginSyncProvider) => () => void;
/** Needs sync:provide. The replica store, change feed and link registry. */
readonly host: PluginSyncHost;
}
/**
* The plugin that owns server and desktop sync. Core forwards every request
* under /sync to `handle` (an Express style handler) and answers 404 when no
* plugin provides it. Call `next()` to let core answer instead.
*/
export interface PluginSyncProvider {
handle: (
req: unknown,
res: unknown,
next: (error?: unknown) => void,
) => void | Promise<void>;
}
/** A kind of data that syncs, as the sync provider sees it. */
export interface SyncEntityInfo {
type: string;
owner: string;
order: number;
readOnly: boolean;
/** Whether the row would show in a load even if it exists. */
covers?: (syncId: string) => boolean;
}
/** A row ready for the wire, with its content hash. */
export interface SyncWireRow {
syncId: string;
wire: SyncRow;
hash: string;
}
export interface SyncRecordInfo {
entityType: string;
syncId: string;
revision: number;
hash: string | null;
deleted: boolean;
error: string | null;
errorHash: string | null;
seq: number;
}
export interface SyncConflictInfo {
id: number;
entityType: string;
syncId: string;
localRow: string;
createdAt: string;
}
export interface SyncAccountInfo {
id: string;
username: string;
isAdmin: boolean;
active: boolean;
}
export interface SyncProxyHeader {
name: string;
value: string;
}
export interface SyncBasicAuth {
username: string;
password: string;
}
/** A client certificate for a server that asks for mutual TLS. */
export interface SyncClientCert {
/** Base64 of the PFX/P12 file. */
pfx: string;
passphrase: string;
/** The file name, to show which certificate is saved. */
name: string | null;
}
/** Extra per server connection options. Kept open so new ones need no migration. */
export type SyncLinkOptions = Record<string, unknown>;
/** One server a desktop is linked to, with a replica of its data. */
export interface SyncLinkInfo {
id: number;
/** The local user the replica belongs to. */
userId: string;
serverUrl: string;
serverName: string | null;
serverVersion: string | null;
sessionToken: string | null;
customHeaders: SyncProxyHeader[];
basicAuth: SyncBasicAuth | null;
allowInvalidCertificate: boolean;
clientCert: SyncClientCert | null;
remoteUserId: string | null;
remoteUsername: string | null;
account: {
remoteUserId?: string;
username?: string;
isAdmin?: boolean;
roles?: string[];
permissions?: string[];
} | null;
disabledTypes: string[];
/** Extra connection options for this server, kept open for new ones. */
options: SyncLinkOptions;
knownTypes: string[];
cursor: number;
status: "idle" | "syncing" | "offline" | "error" | "signed_out";
lastError: string | null;
linkedAt: string;
lastSyncAt: string | null;
}
export interface SyncLinkCreate {
userId: string;
serverUrl: string;
serverName?: string | null;
serverVersion?: string | null;
sessionToken: string;
customHeaders?: SyncProxyHeader[];
basicAuth?: SyncBasicAuth | null;
allowInvalidCertificate?: boolean;
clientCert?: SyncClientCert | null;
remoteUserId?: string | null;
remoteUsername?: string | null;
}
export type SyncLinkPatch = Partial<
Pick<
SyncLinkInfo,
| "serverName"
| "serverVersion"
| "sessionToken"
| "customHeaders"
| "basicAuth"
| "allowInvalidCertificate"
| "clientCert"
| "remoteUserId"
| "remoteUsername"
| "account"
| "disabledTypes"
| "options"
| "knownTypes"
| "cursor"
| "status"
| "lastError"
| "lastSyncAt"
>
>;
export type SyncRemoteErrorKind =
| "offline"
| "tls"
| "client_cert"
| "proxy"
| "basic_auth"
| "signed_out"
| "server";
export interface SyncRemoteError extends Error {
readonly kind: SyncRemoteErrorKind;
readonly status?: number;
}
export interface SyncRemoteTarget {
serverUrl: string;
sessionToken?: string | null;
customHeaders?: SyncProxyHeader[];
basicAuth?: SyncBasicAuth | null;
allowInvalidCertificate?: boolean;
clientCert?: SyncClientCert | null;
}
export interface SyncRemoteRequest {
method?: string;
body?: unknown;
timeoutMs?: number;
signal?: AbortSignal;
}
export interface SyncPushOp {
entityType: string;
syncId: string;
baseRevision: number;
op: "upsert" | "delete";
row?: SyncRow;
}
export type SyncPushResult =
| { syncId: string; entityType: string; status: "ok"; revision: number }
| {
syncId: string;
entityType: string;
status: "conflict";
revision: number;
deleted: boolean;
row: SyncRow | null;
}
| { syncId: string; entityType: string; status: "rejected"; reason: string };
export interface SyncRemotePlugin {
id: string;
name: string;
version: string;
source: string;
artifact: boolean;
enabled: boolean;
active: boolean;
desktop: string;
syncEntities: string[];
granted: string[];
}
/**
* What the sync provider gets from core: the replica store, the change feed,
* the linked server registry, sessions and a few helpers. Core keeps all of
* it neutral; the provider decides when and how to use it. Needs sync:provide.
*/
export interface PluginSyncHost {
/** True on the desktop app's own backend. */
readonly embedded: boolean;
info: { appName: () => Promise<string>; version: () => string };
entities: {
list: () => SyncEntityInfo[];
get: (type: string) => SyncEntityInfo | undefined;
/** Registers core's own entities once. */
ensureCore: () => Promise<void>;
onChanged: (listener: () => void) => () => void;
onLocalWrite: (listener: () => void) => () => void;
};
/** Rows and bookkeeping of one local user's replica. */
replica: {
resolvers: (userId: string, onMissing?: () => void) => unknown;
loadRows: (
type: string,
userId: string,
resolvers: unknown,
) => Promise<{ rows: Map<string, SyncWireRow>; failed: Set<string> }>;
loadRow: (
type: string,
userId: string,
syncId: string,
resolvers: unknown,
) => Promise<SyncWireRow | null>;
writeRow: (
type: string,
userId: string,
wire: SyncRow,
resolvers: unknown,
) => Promise<void>;
deleteRow: (type: string, userId: string, syncId: string) => Promise<void>;
orderSelfReferences: (type: string, rows: SyncRow[]) => SyncRow[];
counts: (userId: string) => Promise<Record<string, number>>;
wipe: (userId: string) => Promise<void>;
regenerateSyncIds: (userId: string) => Promise<void>;
removeSharedCopies: (userId: string) => Promise<void>;
records: {
list: (userId: string) => Promise<Map<string, SyncRecordInfo>>;
put: (
userId: string,
type: string,
syncId: string,
values: { revision: number; hash: string | null; deleted: boolean },
) => Promise<void>;
setError: (
userId: string,
type: string,
syncId: string,
reason: string,
hash: string,
) => Promise<void>;
clearErrors: (userId: string) => Promise<void>;
listErrors: (userId: string) => Promise<SyncRecordInfo[]>;
deleteForUser: (userId: string) => Promise<void>;
key: (type: string, syncId: string) => string;
};
conflicts: {
save: (
userId: string,
type: string,
syncId: string,
row: SyncRow,
revision: number,
) => Promise<void>;
list: (userId: string) => Promise<SyncConflictInfo[]>;
get: (userId: string, id: number) => Promise<SyncConflictInfo | null>;
delete: (userId: string, id: number) => Promise<void>;
};
};
/** The server side: what changed for an account and what a desktop pushed. */
feed: {
withUserLock: <T>(userId: string, run: () => Promise<T>) => Promise<T>;
changes: (
userId: string,
cursor: number,
limit: number,
types?: string[],
) => Promise<{
records: Array<{
seq: number;
entityType: string;
syncId: string;
revision: number;
deleted: boolean;
row: SyncRow | null;
}>;
hasMore: boolean;
nextCursor: number;
entityTypes: Array<{
type: string;
owner: string;
order: number;
readOnly: boolean;
}>;
}>;
parsePushOps: (body: unknown) => Promise<SyncPushOp[] | null>;
applyPush: (userId: string, ops: SyncPushOp[]) => Promise<SyncPushResult[]>;
/** Streams a change notice to the account's open event streams. */
listen: (userId: string, res: unknown) => Promise<() => void>;
};
/**
* The linked server registry, kept in core so it is there before plugins.
* One link per local user. Without a user, the active account is meant.
*/
links: {
list: () => Promise<SyncLinkInfo[]>;
get: (userId?: string) => Promise<SyncLinkInfo | null>;
create: (link: SyncLinkCreate) => Promise<SyncLinkInfo>;
update: (
patch: SyncLinkPatch,
userId?: string,
) => Promise<SyncLinkInfo | null>;
remove: (userId?: string) => Promise<void>;
};
/** Desktop accounts: the local user and the replica user of each server. */
accounts: {
list: () => Promise<SyncAccountInfo[]>;
/** A new empty account, ready to be linked to a server. */
create: () => Promise<string>;
/** Which account the app signs in as from now on. */
setActive: (userId: string) => Promise<void>;
activeId: () => Promise<string | null>;
/** Deletes an account and all its data. The last one cannot go. */
remove: (userId: string) => Promise<void>;
};
http: {
json: <T>(
target: SyncRemoteTarget,
pathname: string,
request?: SyncRemoteRequest,
) => Promise<T>;
fetch: (
target: SyncRemoteTarget,
pathname: string,
request?: SyncRemoteRequest,
) => Promise<{
ok: boolean;
status: number;
body: AsyncIterable<Uint8Array> | null;
}>;
normalizeServerUrl: (input: string) => string | null;
isRemoteError: (error: unknown) => error is SyncRemoteError;
};
sessions: {
/** A long lived session for a linked desktop. Shows in the account's sessions. */
issueDesktop: (
userId: string,
options: { days: number; deviceInfo: string },
) => Promise<string>;
revoke: (sessionId: string) => Promise<void>;
find: (
sessionId: string,
) => Promise<{ expiresAt: string; deviceInfo: string | null } | null>;
findUser: (
userId: string,
) => Promise<{ id: string; username: string } | null>;
/** The user and session behind a token, or null when it is not valid. */
verify: (
token: string,
) => Promise<{ userId: string; sessionId?: string } | null>;
/** Sets the sign in cookie on a response, like a login does. A name sets another cookie. */
setCookie: (
req: unknown,
res: unknown,
value: string,
options?: { name?: string; days?: number },
) => void;
/** Removes the sign in cookie, without ending the session behind it. */
clearCookie: (req: unknown, res: unknown, name?: string) => void;
/** Express middleware that signs the request in and sets userId and sessionId. */
middleware: () => unknown;
/** Express middleware that lets a request through only on a desktop. */
desktopOnly: () => unknown;
};
hosts: {
findForSync: (
userId: string,
syncId: string,
) => Promise<{ id: number; name: string | null } | null>;
statusBySyncId: (userId: string) => Promise<Record<string, unknown>>;
};
plugins: {
listForDesktop: () => Promise<{
plugins: SyncRemotePlugin[];
registryKeys: unknown;
}>;
/** Sends a plugin archive; false when there is no such plugin to share. */
sendPackage: (pluginId: string, res: unknown) => Promise<boolean>;
mirror: (link: SyncLinkInfo) => Promise<void>;
lastRemote: () => SyncRemotePlugin[];
localNames: () => Map<string, string>;
};
desktop: {
/** Tells the app's main process how to reach the linked origin. */
applyProxy: (link: SyncLinkInfo | null) => Promise<void>;
deviceName: () => string;
};
alerts: {
send: (alert: {
title: string;
body: string;
severity: "info" | "warning" | "error";
category: string;
dedupeKey: string;
link?: { tab: string };
}) => Promise<void>;
};
}
/**
* A plain key/value hand-off between plugins. `provide` and `revoke` only take
* keys under the plugin's own id (`<pluginId>.something`); anyone may
* `consume`.
*/
export interface PluginRegistry {
provide: <T>(key: string, value: T) => void;
consume: <T>(key: string) => T | undefined;
revoke: (key: string, value?: unknown) => boolean;
}
export interface PluginServices {
/**
* `name` registers one of several providers of the same service, for a
* service keyed by something the caller picks (sessions.live by session
* type). It must be listed in the manifest's `provides[].names`.
*/
provide: <T extends object>(
service: string,
implementation: T,
options?: { name?: string },
) => void;
/**
* The service must be listed in the manifest's `requires` (or be one this
* plugin provides). `provider` picks a named provider; omitted, the unnamed
* one. A `userId` other than the acting user needs users:impersonate.
*/
get: <T extends object>(
service: string,
options?: { userId?: string; provider?: string },
) => T;
/** Names of the providers running now ("" for an unnamed one). */
providers: (service: string) => string[];
}
export interface PluginSecrets {
/**
* The acting user's own copy of a secret this plugin stored, decrypted, or
* null when nothing is stored. Needs secrets:own and an actor. Not audited:
* a plugin reads its keys on every request that uses them.
*/
get: (key: string) => Promise<string | null>;
/**
* Stores a secret for the acting user, encrypted at rest. Null clears it.
* Needs secrets:own and an actor. Audited without the value.
*/
set: (key: string, value: string | null) => Promise<void>;
/** Removes the acting user's secret. Needs secrets:own. Audited. */
delete: (key: string) => Promise<void>;
/**
* Encrypts a value with the installation key, for a plugin that keeps a
* secret in its own table and has to read it without an acting user (a
* second factor checked during login). Needs secrets:own. Not audited.
*/
seal: (value: string) => Promise<string>;
/** Reverses seal(). Null when the value cannot be decrypted. */
unseal: (sealed: string) => Promise<string | null>;
offer: (
key: string,
resolve: (userId: string) => Promise<string | null> | string | null,
) => void;
withdraw: (key: string) => boolean;
getShared: (
pluginId: string,
key: string,
options?: { userId?: string },
) => Promise<string | null>;
}
/**
* Express types, structurally. The SDK does not depend on express: a plugin
* brings its own copy, and a nominal type from core's would not match it.
*/
export interface PluginRequestLike {
method: string;
url: string;
path: string;
headers: Record<string, unknown>;
[key: string]: unknown;
}
export interface PluginResponseLike {
status: (code: number) => PluginResponseLike;
json: (body: unknown) => unknown;
[key: string]: unknown;
}
export type PluginNextFunction = (error?: unknown) => void;
export type PluginMiddleware = (
req: PluginRequestLike,
res: PluginResponseLike,
next: PluginNextFunction,
) => void;
export interface PluginRouterOptions {
/**
* Paths served without authentication, relative to the plugin's mount point
* and matched exactly ("/callback", not "/plugin-api/<id>/callback"). A
* ":name" segment matches one segment, and a trailing "/*" matches any
* number of further segments, for a proxied page ("/chooser/:id/*").
* An entry only opens the route registered with that same path, for the
* methods it was registered with, so a literal route beside a ":param"
* ("/webhook/config" next to "/webhook/:token") still needs a login.
*
* For the handful of routes an unauthenticated third party has to reach: an
* OIDC callback, an inbound webhook. Every entry is audited when the router
* is registered and every request that uses one is logged, because "this
* plugin opened a hole in auth" is exactly the thing an operator should be
* able to find later.
*/
public?: readonly string[];
/** Body size limit for JSON and urlencoded bodies. Defaults to "1mb". */
bodyLimit?: string;
/**
* Skips the built-in body parsers entirely, for a router that parses its own
* (multer, a raw body for signature checking, a proxied stream).
*/
rawBody?: boolean;
/**
* Requests per minute one address may make to this plugin's public routes.
* Defaults to 120, which a proxied page loading its own scripts and images
* can pass on its own. Capped at 10000, and an admin's
* TERMIX_PLUGIN_PUBLIC_RATE_LIMIT wins over it.
*/
publicRateLimit?: number;
}
/**
* HTTP routes, served at /plugin-api/<id>/ by the main backend server.
*
* No plugin gets its own port or nginx block. Core runs auth, the actor, the
* enabled check, body limits and an error wrapper in front of every route, so
* a plugin's router only has to handle its own paths.
*/
export interface PluginHttp {
/**
* Returns an Express Router mounted at /plugin-api/<id>/. Call it once in
* activate and register routes on the result; it is unmounted automatically
* on deactivate.
*/
router: <T = unknown>(options?: PluginRouterOptions) => T;
/**
* The public base URL a request came in on: origin plus the install's base
* path, no trailing slash. Honours forwarded headers from a trusted proxy,
* BASE_PATH and EXTERNAL_FORCE_HTTPS. For building absolute callback URLs.
*/
baseUrl: (req: unknown) => string;
}
/**
* Core RBAC, as a plugin sees it.
*
* Every method takes either a short name this plugin declares
* ("services.use"), which is prefixed with the plugin id, or a full id
* belonging to another plugin or a core group, which is used as given. That is
* what makes a cross-plugin check expressible without letting a plugin gate its
* own routes on someone else's authority.
*/
export interface PluginRbac {
/** Whether the user this call is running as holds `permission`. */
has: (permission: string) => Promise<boolean>;
/** Whether `userId` holds `permission`. */
hasFor: (userId: string, permission: string) => Promise<boolean>;
/**
* Middleware that rejects a request whose user lacks `permission`.
*
* A plugin may only require a permission it declares in
* contributes.permissions, so a route cannot gate on admin.users.manage and
* borrow someone else's authority.
*/
require: (permission: string) => PluginMiddleware;
}
export interface PluginWebSocketConnection {
/** The authenticated user for this socket. */
readonly userId: string;
/** The upgrade request, for query parameters and headers. */
readonly request: unknown;
/** The ws WebSocket. Binary frames and backpressure work as usual. */
readonly socket: unknown;
/** The client address, behind a trusted proxy when one is configured. */
readonly clientIp: string;
/** The public origin the request came in on, for browser redirects. */
readonly requestOrigin: string;
/**
* Whether the user's data key is still unlocked. False for a guest and
* once a session expires, so a long-lived socket can refuse work it can no
* longer decrypt for.
*/
isDataUnlocked: () => boolean;
}
export type PluginWebSocketHandler = (
connection: PluginWebSocketConnection,
) => void | Promise<void>;
export interface PluginWebSocketOptions {
/**
* Serves the upgrade without core authentication. The handler gets an empty
* userId and must authenticate the socket itself, which is what a share-link
* guest or a token-in-query protocol needs.
*/
public?: boolean;
/**
* With `public`, still resolves a token when the client sent one, so one
* route can serve signed-in users and a guest arriving with a token of its
* own. The handler gets the user id, or an empty one for a guest.
*/
optionalAuth?: boolean;
}
/**
* WebSocket routes, served at /plugin-ws/<id>/<path> through the main server's
* upgrade event. Every socket a plugin opened is closed on deactivate.
*/
export interface PluginWebSockets {
route: (
path: string,
handler: PluginWebSocketHandler,
options?: PluginWebSocketOptions,
) => void;
/**
* Hands the raw upgrade to the plugin, for a library that insists on owning
* its own WebSocket server (guacamole-lite attaches this way). Auth and the
* actor still run first.
*/
upgrade: (
path: string,
handler: (
request: unknown,
socket: unknown,
head: unknown,
userId: string,
) => void,
options?: PluginWebSocketOptions,
) => void;
}
/**
* Anything the runtime should undo when the plugin deactivates. Everything
* registered through ctx is tracked automatically; this is for resources a
* plugin creates itself, such as a server or an interval.
*/
export interface PluginDisposables {
add: (dispose: () => void | Promise<void>) => void;
}
/**
* The plugin's own settings, as declared in contributes.settings.
*
* Reading and writing a plugin's own settings needs no capability: the
* manifest already says which fields exist, and a plugin that could not read
* its own configuration would be useless. Only readCore, which reaches outside
* the plugin's namespace, is gated on settings:read-core.
*
* Values are validated against the declared field on every write, so a key the
* manifest never declared is rejected rather than stored. Secret fields are
* encrypted at rest and returned decrypted here; the HTTP surface never sends
* them to a browser.
*/
export interface PluginSettings {
/** Install-wide admin settings. */
get: <T = unknown>(key: string) => Promise<T | undefined>;
set: (key: string, value: unknown) => Promise<void>;
/** Per-user settings. */
getUser: <T = unknown>(userId: string, key: string) => Promise<T | undefined>;
setUser: (userId: string, key: string, value: unknown) => Promise<void>;
/**
* Per-host settings. A host follows its host defaults (server, user,
* folder) for every key it has not set itself, and the value read here is
* already the resolved one.
*/
getHost: <T = unknown>(
hostId: number | string,
key: string,
) => Promise<T | undefined>;
/**
* The value as one user sees it. Only a `personal` field differs from
* getHost: on a host shared with that user and following its defaults, it
* resolves against the user's own defaults rather than the owner's.
*/
getHostFor: <T = unknown>(
hostId: number | string,
userId: string,
key: string,
) => Promise<T | undefined>;
/**
* What a user's hosts get for a host field when nothing more specific
* sets it: their own defaults, then the server's, then the manifest
* default. For something with no host, such as a quick connect.
*/
getHostDefault: <T = unknown>(
userId: string,
key: string,
) => Promise<T | undefined>;
/**
* Writes a host value, which makes it the host's own rather than
* following its defaults. `{ inherit: true }` hands the key back to the
* defaults instead and ignores `value`.
*/
setHost: (
hostId: number | string,
key: string,
value: unknown,
options?: { inherit?: boolean },
) => Promise<void>;
/**
* Every host that saved a value for one of this plugin's host fields, across
* all users, with the host's owner. For a background job that must know
* which hosts to act on, and as whom, before any request is in flight.
* Requires hosts:read. Secret fields cannot be listed.
*/
listHostValues: <T = unknown>(
key: string,
) => Promise<Array<{ hostId: number; userId: string; value: T }>>;
/** Every value in one scope, with declared defaults merged in. */
getAll: (
scope: "admin" | "user" | "host",
scopeId?: string | number,
) => Promise<Record<string, unknown>>;
/**
* Fires when a key in this plugin's settings changes, from either the ctx
* API or the HTTP routes. Disposed automatically on deactivate.
*/
onChange: (key: string, listener: (value: unknown) => void) => () => void;
/**
* Checks a save from the settings screen or host editor before anything is
* written. Return field key to message for what is wrong; nothing means the
* save goes ahead. Disposed automatically on deactivate.
*/
onValidate: (
scope: "admin" | "user" | "host",
validator: (
values: Record<string, unknown>,
/**
* `defaults` is set when the values are a host defaults level being
* saved rather than one host, so there is no hostId.
*/
context: {
hostId?: number;
defaults?: { level: "admin" | "user" | "folder" };
},
) => Record<string, string> | void | Promise<Record<string, string> | void>,
) => () => void;
/**
* Reads a core server setting from a small documented allowlist.
* Requires the settings:read-core capability.
*/
readCore: (key: string) => Promise<string | null>;
}
/** A host's non-secret fields, for listing, tag matching and display. */
export interface PluginHostSummary {
id: number;
userId: string;
name: string | null;
ip: string;
port: number;
username: string;
/** Comma-separated, as ssh_data stores them. Split on "," to match tags. */
tags: string | null;
folder: string | null;
authType: string;
}
/**
* A host as ctx.hosts hands it to a plugin that creates, updates or scans
* hosts on the user's behalf (import, discovery, sync), decrypted for that
* user. Every field is listed here and core builds it field by field, so a
* core column a plugin needs has to be added to this contract first. Carries
* no secret auth material (password, key, vault tokens): a plugin that
* creates a host picks an authType and, for "credential", a credentialId it
* does not need to see the contents of.
*/
export interface PluginHostRecord {
id: number;
userId: string;
/** Stable across a desktop and the server it syncs with. */
syncId: string | null;
name: string | null;
ip: string;
port: number;
username: string;
authType: string;
credentialId: number | null;
overrideCredentialUsername: boolean;
/** "ssh", or the id of the plugin protocol a host without SSH uses. */
connectionType: string;
/** Comma-separated, as ssh_data stores them. */
tags: string | null;
folder: string | null;
parentHostId: number | null;
pin: boolean;
notes: string | null;
jumpHosts: PluginHostJumpHost[];
enableSsh: boolean;
sshPort: number | null;
statusCheckEnabled: boolean;
/** Seconds between status checks; null follows the global setting. */
statusCheckInterval: number | null;
connectionOrigin: "local" | "remote" | null;
/** Keepalive, legacy algorithms, agent and environment options. */
sshOptions: HostSshOptions;
/**
* The calling plugin's own host settings, secrets redacted. Another
* plugin's settings are that plugin's to hand out, through a service.
*/
pluginSettings: Record<string, unknown>;
/** Core's last reachability check, or null before the first one. */
status: PluginHostStatusEntry | null;
/** Desktop only: kept on this device, never synced to the server. */
localOnly: boolean;
createdAt: string | null;
updatedAt: string | null;
}
export interface PluginHostJumpHost {
hostId: number;
}
/**
* The fields a plugin may set when it creates a host. A key not listed here
* is refused with an error rather than dropped. Host settings go in
* `pluginSettings`, keyed by the plugin that declares them, and are
* validated against that plugin's manifest: an undeclared key is refused, and
* settings for a plugin that is not running are skipped and logged.
*/
export interface PluginHostCreateInput {
name: string;
ip: string;
port: number;
username: string;
authType: string;
credentialId?: number | null;
overrideCredentialUsername?: boolean;
connectionType?: string;
/** Comma-separated or a list. */
tags?: string | string[] | null;
folder?: string | null;
pin?: boolean;
notes?: string | null;
jumpHosts?: PluginHostJumpHost[] | null;
enableSsh?: boolean;
sshPort?: number | null;
statusCheckEnabled?: boolean;
statusCheckInterval?: number | null;
forceKeyboardInteractive?: boolean;
sshOptions?: HostSshOptions | null;
/** Host settings by plugin id, the shape a Termix export carries. */
pluginSettings?: Record<string, Record<string, unknown>>;
/**
* Each plugin's own host switch (its manifest enableKey), by plugin id.
* A plugin that is not running is skipped and logged; one with no switch
* is refused.
*/
pluginEnable?: Record<string, boolean>;
/**
* Secrets, stored encrypted with the owner's data key and never returned
* in a PluginHostRecord. An empty string or null clears the stored value.
*/
password?: string | null;
key?: string | null;
keyPassword?: string | null;
keyType?: string | null;
sudoPassword?: string | null;
/**
* Logins for plugin protocols (contributes.protocols), keyed by protocol
* id. null removes that protocol's login. Unknown protocol ids are skipped.
*/
protocolAuth?: Record<string, PluginHostProtocolAuthInput | null>;
}
/** One protocol login on a host write. Absent keys keep what is stored. */
export interface PluginHostProtocolAuthInput {
authType?: "direct" | "credential" | "none";
credentialId?: number | null;
username?: string | null;
password?: string | null;
/** The protocol's declared credentialFields, secret ones included. */
fields?: Record<string, string>;
}
/** Fields a plugin may change on a host the acting user owns. */
export type PluginHostUpdateInput = Partial<PluginHostCreateInput>;
/** Every key PluginHostCreateInput and PluginHostUpdateInput accept. */
export const PLUGIN_HOST_INPUT_KEYS = [
"name",
"ip",
"port",
"username",
"authType",
"credentialId",
"overrideCredentialUsername",
"connectionType",
"tags",
"folder",
"pin",
"notes",
"jumpHosts",
"enableSsh",
"sshPort",
"statusCheckEnabled",
"statusCheckInterval",
"forceKeyboardInteractive",
"sshOptions",
"pluginSettings",
"pluginEnable",
"password",
"key",
"keyPassword",
"keyType",
"sudoPassword",
"protocolAuth",
] as const satisfies readonly (keyof PluginHostCreateInput)[];
/** The same shape canAccessHost returns internally, without secrets. */
export interface PluginHostAccess {
hasAccess: boolean;
isOwner: boolean;
isShared: boolean;
permissionLevel?: "connect" | "view" | "edit" | "manage";
expiresAt?: string | null;
}
export type PluginHostShareLevel = "connect" | "view" | "edit" | "manage";
export interface PluginShareTarget {
type: "user" | "role";
id: string | number;
}
export interface PluginHostShareResult {
hostId: number;
shared: boolean;
reason?: string;
}
/** A user or role a plugin can offer as a share target. No secrets, no roles' permission lists. */
export interface PluginShareableUser {
id: string;
username: string;
}
export interface PluginShareableRole {
id: number;
name: string;
displayName: string | null;
}
/** One grant in ctx.hosts.setShares. */
export interface PluginHostShareGrant {
target: PluginShareTarget;
permissionLevel: PluginHostShareLevel;
/** Omit for a grant that never expires. */
durationHours?: number;
}
/**
* Hosts a plugin manages itself, for example from a config file. Core refuses
* edits, deletes and share changes on a locked host from the UI, the API and
* other plugins, and marks it in host reads so a layout can show it read only.
* Pins and order stay with the user. Only the plugin that locks a host may
* still write it.
*/
export interface PluginHostLockProvider {
isLocked: (hostId: number) => boolean;
/** A short line shown under the managed note, or null. */
note: (hostId: number) => string | null;
/** False blocks adding hosts by hand (editor, import, other plugins). */
allowManualCreate: () => boolean;
}
export interface PluginHostLocksApi {
/** Registers this plugin's locks. Needs hosts:lock. Removed on deactivate. */
provide: (provider: PluginHostLockProvider) => () => void;
}
/**
* Hosts the acting user can see, and the RBAC + sharing operations a plugin
* needs to build a feature (like fleets) on top of hosts it does not own.
*
* list/get/checkAccess need hosts:read. share, and the user/role pickers a
* share UI needs, need hosts:write: sharing changes who can reach a host,
* which is a write on that host's access, even though the plugin owns
* neither the host nor the grant.
*/
export interface PluginHosts {
/** Every host the acting user owns or was shared, without secrets. */
list: () => Promise<PluginHostSummary[]>;
/** One host the acting user can see, or null if it does not exist or they cannot. */
get: (hostId: number) => Promise<PluginHostSummary | null>;
/** The same access rule ctx.ssh.connect enforces, but naming the level, not just yes/no. */
checkAccess: (
hostId: number,
level: PluginHostShareLevel,
) => Promise<PluginHostAccess>;
/**
* Creates a host owned by the acting user, encrypted the same way the host
* editor's own create route does it. Needs hosts:write. For a plugin that
* imports or discovers hosts on the user's behalf (B5's proxmox discovery).
*/
create: (host: PluginHostCreateInput) => Promise<PluginHostRecord>;
/**
* Updates a host the acting user owns. Refuses a host it does not own
* (sharing a write onto someone else's host goes through share(), not
* update()). Needs hosts:write.
*/
update: (
hostId: number,
patch: PluginHostUpdateInput,
) => Promise<PluginHostRecord | null>;
/**
* Deletes a host the acting user owns, the same way the host editor's
* delete does: its access grants, activity and plugin settings go with it
* and remote sync gets a tombstone. Needs hosts:write, and the acting user
* needs the core hosts.delete permission. False when the host does not
* exist or is not theirs.
*/
delete: (hostId: number) => Promise<boolean>;
/**
* Every host the acting user owns, decrypted and wide (PluginHostRecord,
* not the narrow list() summary). For a plugin that scans its own hosts in
* the background (auto-sync) and needs fields list() does not carry, such
* as credentialId or jumpHosts. Needs hosts:write, matching create/update:
* this is the same "full host detail" surface a create/update caller needs
* to read back, not a wider read grant than hosts:read gives via list/get.
*/
listOwned: () => Promise<PluginHostRecord[]>;
/**
* Grants access to a host the caller manages, snapshotting shared secrets
* for each target the same way the host editor's own share action does.
* Refuses a host the caller does not hold "manage" on.
*/
share: (
hostId: number,
targets: PluginShareTarget[],
permissionLevel: PluginHostShareLevel,
durationHours?: number,
) => Promise<PluginHostShareResult>;
/**
* Replaces every grant on a host the acting user owns with this list.
* Grants that stay keep their row and counters, missing ones are revoked.
* Needs hosts:write.
*/
setShares: (
hostId: number,
grants: PluginHostShareGrant[],
) => Promise<PluginHostShareResult>;
/** Users the caller may pick as a share target, for building a picker UI. */
listUsers: () => Promise<PluginShareableUser[]>;
/** Non-system roles the caller may pick as a share target. */
listRoles: () => Promise<PluginShareableRole[]>;
/**
* Marks a live session on a host, for the online indicator. Counted with
* every other feature's sessions; call the returned function once when the
* session ends. Needs hosts:read.
*/
trackSession: (hostId: number) => () => void;
/**
* Adds a recent activity entry for the acting user, rate limited and
* refused for a host they cannot reach, like the dashboard's own route.
* Needs hosts:read.
*/
recordActivity: (
hostId: number,
type: string,
hostName: string,
) => Promise<void>;
/**
* Core's reachability status, the one behind the host list's status dot.
* Needs hosts:read.
*/
status: PluginHostStatusApi;
/**
* The hosts the acting user may connect to (their own and shared ones) as a
* status provider needs them: address, port and jump hosts, no secrets.
* Pass hostIds to narrow it. Needs hosts:read.
*/
probeTargets: (filter?: {
hostIds?: number[];
}) => Promise<PluginHostProbeTarget[]>;
/** Whether a session is open to the host right now. Needs hosts:read. */
sessionActive: (hostId: number) => boolean;
/**
* Imports Termix JSON host rows for the acting user, the same way POST
* /host/bulk-import does: up to 100 rows, jump hosts remapped by exportId,
* defaults, protocol logins and plugin settings applied, one save at the end.
* Needs hosts:write, plus credentials:write when credentials are passed, and
* the acting user needs the core hosts.create and hosts.edit permissions.
*/
importMany: (
hosts: Record<string, unknown>[],
options?: PluginHostImportOptions,
) => Promise<PluginHostImportResult>;
/** Imports the Host entries of an OpenSSH config file. Same rules as importMany. */
importSshConfig: (
content: string,
options?: Pick<PluginHostImportOptions, "overwrite" | "atomic">,
) => Promise<PluginHostImportResult>;
/**
* The acting user's own hosts as Termix JSON. Without share the secrets are
* included, decrypted. With share every secret is left out and credential
* logins point at a scrubbed credentials list by alias. Needs hosts:export
* and is always audited.
*/
exportMany: (options?: {
share?: boolean;
/** Only these of the user's hosts. */
hostIds?: number[];
}) => Promise<PluginHostExport>;
/**
* Validates and writes this plugin's own host settings from an imported
* row. Called for every imported row once the host exists. Return the
* values to write, or null to write nothing. Removed when the plugin
* deactivates. Needs hosts:write.
*/
registerImportNormalizer: (
normalizer: PluginHostImportNormalizer,
) => () => void;
/** The recent activity list on the dashboard. */
activity: PluginHostActivityApi;
/** Read only hosts this plugin manages. */
locks: PluginHostLocksApi;
/** Folder rows for the acting user. Needs hosts:write. */
folders: PluginHostFoldersApi;
}
export interface PluginHostFoldersApi {
/** Creates the folder row if missing and sets its color and icon. */
ensure: (
name: string,
style?: { color?: string | null; icon?: string | null },
) => Promise<void>;
/** Removes the folder row and subfolders once no host is left in them. */
removeEmpty: (name: string) => Promise<boolean>;
}
export interface PluginHostImportOptions {
/** Update a host that matches on ip, port and username instead of skipping it. */
overwrite?: boolean;
/**
* All or nothing: if any row fails, the hosts this call created are deleted
* and the result says rolledBack. Cannot be combined with overwrite.
*/
atomic?: boolean;
/** Credential placeholders rows can refer to by credentialAlias. */
credentials?: Array<Record<string, unknown>>;
}
export interface PluginHostImportResult {
success: number;
updated: number;
skipped: number;
failed: number;
errors: string[];
createdHostIds: number[];
rolledBack?: boolean;
}
export interface PluginHostExport {
hosts: Array<Record<string, unknown>>;
/** Share exports only. */
version?: string;
exportedAt?: string;
credentials?: Array<Record<string, unknown>>;
}
export type PluginHostImportNormalizer = (
raw: Record<string, unknown>,
) => Record<string, unknown> | null;
export interface PluginHostProbeTarget {
id: number;
/** The user who owns the host; its jump hosts are theirs. */
ownerUserId: string;
ip: string;
port: number;
connectionType: string;
jumpHosts: Array<{ hostId: number }>;
statusCheckEnabled: boolean;
/** Seconds, or null to use the global interval. */
statusCheckInterval: number | null;
}
/**
* The plugin that owns host status. Core keeps the routes, the sync feed and
* ctx.hosts.status; this fills them. One provider at a time.
*/
export interface PluginHostStatusProvider {
start: () => void;
stop: () => void;
get: (hostId: number) => PluginHostStatusEntry | null;
/**
* Every status known, after polling is brought in line with the request:
* with hostIds, exactly those of the user's hosts; without, all of them.
*/
statusesFor: (
userId: string,
hostIds: number[] | null,
) => Promise<Map<number, PluginHostStatusEntry>>;
/** Restarts the user's checks. */
refresh: (userId: string) => Promise<void>;
check: (hostId: number) => Promise<PluginHostStatusEntry | null>;
reportLogin: (hostId: number, outcome: { ok: boolean }) => void;
registerPort: (
connectionType: string,
resolve: (
hostId: number,
) => number | undefined | Promise<number | undefined>,
) => () => void;
/** The global check interval in seconds. */
getIntervalSeconds: () => Promise<number>;
setIntervalSeconds: (seconds: number) => Promise<void>;
}
export interface PluginActivityEntry {
id: number;
userId: string;
type: string;
hostId: number;
hostName: string | null;
timestamp: string;
}
export type PluginRecordActivityResult =
| { status: "logged"; id: number }
| { status: "rate_limited" }
| { status: "invalid_type" }
| { status: "denied" }
| { status: "unavailable" };
/** The plugin that stores recent activity. One provider at a time. */
export interface PluginActivityProvider {
record: (
userId: string,
entry: { type: string; hostId: number; hostName: string },
) => Promise<PluginRecordActivityResult>;
list: (userId: string, limit: number) => Promise<PluginActivityEntry[]>;
deleteByUserId: (userId: string) => Promise<void>;
deleteByHostIds: (hostIds: number[]) => Promise<void>;
}
export interface PluginHostActivityApi {
/**
* Becomes the store behind the dashboard's recent activity and
* ctx.hosts.recordActivity. Needs hosts:activity-provide. Removed on
* deactivate.
*/
provide: (provider: PluginActivityProvider) => () => void;
}
/**
* online: the port answers, a session is open or a login worked. offline: the
* port does not answer. "reachable" is no longer sent and stays only so older
* plugins still type check.
*/
export type PluginHostStatus = "online" | "reachable" | "offline";
export interface PluginHostStatusEntry {
status: PluginHostStatus;
lastChecked: string;
/** @deprecated No longer sent. */
reason?: "host_key_changed";
}
/**
* Core checks every host with status checks on by opening a TCP connection to
* it. A plugin that logs in to hosts can report a working login, which marks
* the host online right away.
*/
export interface PluginHostStatusApi {
/**
* The last known status, or null when core has not checked the host yet or
* the acting user cannot reach it.
*/
get: (hostId: number) => Promise<PluginHostStatusEntry | null>;
/** Checks the host now unless core checked it recently. */
check: (hostId: number) => Promise<PluginHostStatusEntry | null>;
/**
* Reports a login attempt. Only a working login changes the status; a
* failed one is ignored. Not audited: pollers call it every sample.
*/
reportLogin: (
hostId: number,
outcome: { ok: boolean; hostKeyChanged?: boolean },
) => void;
/**
* Tells core which port proves a host of this connection type is up, for
* protocols whose port lives in the plugin's own host settings. Core falls
* back to the host's port. Removed on deactivate.
*/
registerPort: (
connectionType: string,
resolve: (
hostId: number,
) => number | undefined | Promise<number | undefined>,
) => () => void;
/**
* Becomes core's host status. Needs hosts:status-provide. Removed on
* deactivate, which hands status back to core's built-in checks.
*/
provide: (provider: PluginHostStatusProvider) => () => void;
}
/**
* A host as the SSH pipeline reads it: resolved by core, with secrets filled
* in for the acting user. Plugins get one from core and hand it back; they
* should not build one from scratch.
*/
export interface PluginSshHost {
id: number;
ip: string;
port: number;
username: string;
userId?: string | null;
authType?: string | null;
sshOptions?: HostSshOptions | null;
[key: string]: unknown;
}
/** Picks keepalive and timeout defaults. "plugin" is the generic one. */
/** What a connection is for, as a free label. Auth providers see it. */
export type PluginSshPurpose = string;
/**
* Keepalive, timeout and environment defaults for a kind of connection.
* terminal: an interactive shell. session: a long-lived browsing session.
* stream: a long transfer or console. forward: port forwarding. background
* (the default): short exec work such as polling.
*/
export type PluginSshProfile =
"terminal" | "session" | "stream" | "forward" | "background";
export type PluginSshAuthOutcome =
| { status: "ready" }
| {
status: "interaction-required";
/** Transports send "<interaction>_auth_required", e.g. "opkssh". */
interaction: string;
message: string;
/** Extra boolean HTTP transports put in their 401 body. */
flag?: string;
}
| {
status: "error";
code:
| "missing-secret"
| "invalid-key"
| "passphrase-required"
| "provider-missing"
| "failed";
message: string;
}
| {
/** Try once more with these config changes. */
status: "retry";
patch: Record<string, unknown>;
message: string;
};
export type PluginSshBannerDecision =
| {
/** Hold the connect timeout open and wait for the out-of-band step. */
action: "hold";
timeoutMs: number;
message: string;
details?: Record<string, unknown>;
}
| {
/** The out-of-band step finished; resume the normal connect timeout. */
action: "release";
details?: Record<string, unknown>;
};
export interface PluginKeyboardInteractivePrompt {
prompt: string;
echo?: boolean;
}
/**
* A round the user finishes in a browser: open a URL, confirm a code there,
* then continue. Transports show one generic dialog for it and name their
* messages after `id` (the terminal sends "<id>_auth_required" and waits for
* "<id>_auth_continue").
*/
export interface PluginBrowserSignInRound {
kind: "browser";
/** The keyboard-interactive handler that claimed the round. */
id: string;
/** Product name for the dialog title. */
label: string;
url: string | null;
/** A code to compare in the browser, or "N/A". */
code: string;
instructions: string;
}
export type PluginKeyboardInteractiveDecision =
| { kind: "auto"; responses: string[] }
| PluginBrowserSignInRound
| { kind: "totp"; promptIndex: number }
| { kind: "input"; promptIndex: number; isPush: boolean };
export type PluginSshPromptRequest =
| { kind: "totp"; prompt: string; retry: boolean }
| { kind: "input"; prompt: string; echo: boolean; isPush: boolean }
| PluginBrowserSignInRound;
/** What a keyboard-interactive handler's detect may return. */
export type PluginKeyboardInteractiveDetection =
| Exclude<PluginKeyboardInteractiveDecision, PluginBrowserSignInRound>
| Omit<PluginBrowserSignInRound, "id" | "label">;
/**
* Claims keyboard-interactive rounds on any host, whatever its auth type,
* for a server that speaks its own prompt style (a bastion asking for a
* browser sign-in). Handlers run before core's TOTP and push detection.
*
* `settings` is this plugin's host-scope settings for the host, with manifest
* defaults filled in. Both hooks are synchronous; they run inside ssh2's
* keyboard-interactive callback.
*/
export interface PluginKeyboardInteractiveHandler {
/** Listed in contributes.auth.keyboardInteractive. */
id: string;
/** Product name shown when a browser round is claimed. */
label: string;
detect: (
round: {
name: string;
instructions: string;
prompts: PluginKeyboardInteractivePrompt[];
},
host: PluginSshHost,
settings: Record<string, unknown>,
) => PluginKeyboardInteractiveDetection | null;
/** Answer password prompts with the stored password instead of asking. */
autoAnswerPasswords?: (
host: PluginSshHost,
settings: Record<string, unknown>,
) => boolean;
}
/** Answers keyboard-interactive prompts. Resolve null to give up. */
export interface PluginSshPromptChannel {
ask: (request: PluginSshPromptRequest) => Promise<string | null>;
}
export interface PluginSshConnectOptions {
purpose?: PluginSshPurpose;
/** Keepalive and timeout defaults. Defaults to "background". */
profile?: PluginSshProfile;
/** Overall time to reach "ready". Defaults to 30s. */
timeoutMs?: number;
/** Without one, the stored password answers password prompts. */
prompt?: PluginSshPromptChannel;
/** Config fields to force, e.g. a longer readyTimeout. */
overrides?: Record<string, unknown>;
/**
* An already-open stream to the host, such as a forwardOut channel through
* another host. The transport step is skipped: no port knocking, proxy,
* jump hosts or DNS lookup. Host key checks and auth still run.
*/
sock?: unknown;
}
export interface PluginSshExecOptions extends PluginSshConnectOptions {
/** Time to wait for the command to finish. Default 30s, at most 10 minutes. */
timeoutMs?: number;
/** Most bytes kept of each of stdout and stderr. Default 256 KB, at most 4 MB. */
maxOutputBytes?: number;
/** Written to the command's standard input, then closed. */
stdin?: string;
}
export interface PluginSshExecResult {
stdout: string;
stderr: string;
/** The exit code. Null when the command was killed or ran out of time. */
code: number | null;
/** Output went past maxOutputBytes and the rest was dropped. */
truncated: boolean;
timedOut: boolean;
}
export interface PluginSshConnection<Client = unknown> {
/** An ssh2 Client, already "ready". */
client: Client;
jumpClient: Client | null;
/** The host as core resolved it: ip, port, username, name and the rest. */
host: PluginSshHost;
/** Ends the connection and its jump chain. Also runs on deactivate. */
dispose: () => void;
}
/**
* SSH through core's one connect pipeline: host resolution, auth providers,
* jump hosts, proxies, host key checks, keepalive and port knocking.
*
* Every call needs ssh:connect and credentials:use, runs as the acting user
* (or the host's owner for background work on a resolved host) and writes an
* audit line per new connection. Connections still open on deactivate are
* closed.
*/
export interface PluginNetwork {
/**
* Whether a TCP port answers. An SSH banner is read and answered politely;
* nothing is ever sent that logs in. Loopback, private and link-local
* addresses are allowed, since status checks target the user's own hosts.
*/
tcpProbe: (
host: string,
port: number,
options?: { timeoutMs?: number },
) => Promise<boolean>;
}
/**
* A way to reach some hosts other than a plain TCP connection. `claims` is
* asked for every connection, so it must be quick. `open` returns a stream
* the SSH client runs over, like a relayed socket.
*/
export interface PluginSshTransportProvider {
claims: (hostId: number) => boolean;
open: (host: {
id: number;
ip: string;
port: number;
}) => Promise<import("node:stream").Duplex>;
}
export interface PluginSshTransports {
/** Needs ssh:transport. Removed on deactivate. */
provide: (provider: PluginSshTransportProvider) => () => void;
}
export interface PluginSsh {
/** Other ways to reach hosts, used by every connection to them. */
transports: PluginSshTransports;
/**
* Whether a TCP port answers through the host's jump host chain. Chains are
* shared and closed when idle. The acting user must be able to connect to
* the host. Needs ssh:connect.
*/
probe: (
hostId: number,
options?: { port?: number; timeoutMs?: number },
) => Promise<boolean>;
connect: <Client = unknown>(
host: number | PluginSshHost,
options?: PluginSshConnectOptions,
) => Promise<PluginSshConnection<Client>>;
/**
* Runs one command on a host with its stored login and closes the
* connection. The acting user needs connect access to the host, the same as
* connect. Output is capped and the command is stopped at the time limit.
* Needs ssh:connect and credentials:use.
*/
exec: (
host: number | PluginSshHost,
command: string,
options?: PluginSshExecOptions,
) => Promise<PluginSshExecResult>;
/** Borrows a pooled connection. The pool key is `<pool>:<owner>:<address>`. */
withConnection: <T, Client = unknown>(
host: number | PluginSshHost,
options: PluginSshConnectOptions & { pool: string },
fn: (client: Client) => Promise<T>,
) => Promise<T>;
/**
* A ready client at the end of a jump host chain, each hop resolved and
* authenticated through the pipeline. For forwarding to something that is
* not an SSH server (a remote desktop port behind a bastion).
*/
jumpChain: <Client = unknown>(
jumpHosts: Array<{ hostId: number }>,
options?: {
/** Background work: resolve the hops as this host's owner. */
forHost?: PluginSshHost;
/** Answers a hop asking for TOTP or other input. */
prompt?: PluginSshPromptChannel;
},
) => Promise<PluginSshConnection<Client>>;
/** The pool key withConnection would use, for clearing it. */
poolKey: (pool: string, host: PluginSshHost) => string;
/**
* Closes this plugin's pooled connections to a host, for when its details
* changed. Only keys this plugin created are touched.
*/
dropPooled: (pool: string, hostId: number) => void;
/**
* The host as the acting user may connect to it: RBAC, owner-key
* decryption, shared-host overrides and external secret references
* resolved, secrets included. By sync id when given, since a numeric id
* only names a host on the database that issued it. Null when the host is
* not on this server or the user cannot reach it.
*/
resolveHost: (
hostId: number,
options?: { syncId?: string | null },
) => Promise<PluginSshHost | null>;
/**
* Lower level: fills an ssh2 config for a client the plugin drives itself,
* for transports with their own prompt flow. Never connects.
*/
prepare: (
host: PluginSshHost,
options: {
purpose?: PluginSshPurpose;
/** Keepalive and timeout defaults. Defaults to "background". */
profile?: PluginSshProfile;
client: unknown;
/** Server-side host id when it differs from host.id. */
serverHostId?: number;
log?: (level: "info" | "warning" | "error", message: string) => void;
/** A person is at the keyboard, so providers may prompt. */
interactive?: boolean;
/**
* The ws socket the host key verifier asks on when a key is new or has
* changed. Without one a changed key is refused.
*/
hostKeySocket?: unknown;
},
) => Promise<PluginSshPrepared>;
/** Lower level: port knocking, jump hosts or proxy; sets config.sock. */
openTransport: (
host: PluginSshHost,
config: Record<string, unknown>,
options?: {
/** False when the caller already resolved DNS, or a jump host will. */
resolveDns?: boolean;
log?: (level: "info" | "warning" | "error", message: string) => void;
/** Answers a jump host asking for TOTP or other input. */
prompt?: PluginSshPromptChannel;
},
) => Promise<{ jumpClient: unknown | null; via: string }>;
/**
* Starts the browser step behind an `<interaction>_auth_required` message.
* The provider for the host's own auth type wins, else the first provider
* that owns the interaction. Rejects with PluginSshInteractionError when
* none can.
*/
startInteraction: (
interaction: string,
request: {
hostId: number;
socket: unknown;
requestOrigin: string;
payload?: Record<string, unknown>;
},
) => Promise<void>;
/** Cancels a pending browser step on every provider that owns it. */
cancelInteraction: (
interaction: string,
request: { hostId?: number; requestId?: string },
) => Promise<void>;
/** What a keyboard-interactive round is. Pure; no capability needed. */
classifyKeyboardInteractive: (
round: {
name: string;
instructions: string;
prompts: PluginKeyboardInteractivePrompt[];
},
host: PluginSshHost,
) => PluginKeyboardInteractiveDecision;
/** Stored password for password prompts, empty for the rest. */
autoResponses: (
prompts: PluginKeyboardInteractivePrompt[],
password: string | null | undefined,
) => string[];
/** Whether an auth type carries a secret (drives "auth_required" flows). */
requiresSecret: (authType: string) => boolean;
/** Whether an auth type can connect unattended, for polling. */
supportsBackground: (authType: string) => boolean;
}
/** What ctx.ssh.prepare built, plus the provider hooks bound to it. */
export interface PluginSshPrepared {
config: Record<string, unknown>;
outcome: PluginSshAuthOutcome;
/** The auth type whose provider prepared it, null when none exists. */
authType: string | null;
/** The provider's banner hook, bound to this host and connection. */
onBanner?: (banner: string) => PluginSshBannerDecision | undefined;
/** The provider's auth failure hook, bound to this host and connection. */
onAuthFailed?: (context: {
error: Error;
retries: number;
canRetry: boolean;
methodNotAvailable: boolean;
}) => PluginSshAuthOutcome | undefined;
}
/** Thrown by ctx.ssh.startInteraction when no provider can start it. */
export class PluginSshInteractionError extends Error {
constructor(message: string) {
super(message);
this.name = "PluginSshInteractionError";
}
}
export interface PluginSshAuthEnv {
/** The ssh2 Client about to connect; certificate auth patches it. */
client: unknown;
userId: string;
hostId: number;
purpose: string;
interactive: boolean;
log: (level: "info" | "warning" | "error", message: string) => void;
}
/**
* An SSH auth type. Its `type` is what ssh_data.auth_type stores, and it must
* be listed in the manifest's contributes.auth.sshAuthTypes.
*/
export interface PluginSshAuthProvider {
type: string;
labelKey: string;
descriptionKey?: string;
/** Host and credential editor fields, in the settings field schema. */
fields?: PluginSettingsField[];
/** Also offered as a stored credential type. */
credentialType?: boolean;
/** Needs a browser sign-in or a person at the keyboard. */
needsUserInteraction?: boolean;
/** Carries a secret, so a shared host needs one resolved per recipient. */
requiresSecret?: boolean;
/** Can connect unattended. Defaults to true. */
supportsBackground?: boolean;
/**
* Works for a host that was never saved (nothing in host settings, no host
* id to key a cache on), so Quick Connect offers it. Default false.
*/
quickConnect?: boolean;
/** Interaction name its outcomes use, for startInteraction routing. */
interaction?: string;
connectOptions?: (
host: PluginSshHost,
purpose: string,
) => Record<string, unknown>;
/** Fills the ssh2 config for this host. Never connects. */
prepare: (
config: Record<string, unknown>,
host: PluginSshHost,
env: PluginSshAuthEnv,
) => Promise<PluginSshAuthOutcome>;
/** Claims keyboard-interactive rounds for hosts of this type. */
onKeyboardInteractive?: (
round: {
name: string;
instructions: string;
prompts: PluginKeyboardInteractivePrompt[];
},
host: PluginSshHost,
) => PluginKeyboardInteractiveDecision | null;
/** Synchronous: decide on a retry before the socket closes. */
onAuthFailed?: (
host: PluginSshHost,
env: PluginSshAuthEnv,
context: {
error: Error;
retries: number;
canRetry: boolean;
methodNotAvailable: boolean;
},
) => PluginSshAuthOutcome | undefined;
/**
* Claims an ssh2 "banner" event during the handshake, for a server that
* holds the connection open pending an out-of-band step (Tailscale SSH
* check mode). A transport that can show this sends `<type>_check_required`
* / `<type>_check_completed` over its socket, with `details` merged in.
* Return nothing to leave the banner unhandled.
*/
onBanner?: (
banner: string,
host: PluginSshHost,
env: PluginSshAuthEnv,
) => PluginSshBannerDecision | undefined;
/** Starts the browser step behind an interaction-required outcome. */
startInteraction?: (request: {
userId: string;
hostId: number;
host: { name?: string | null; ip: string; username: string };
socket: unknown;
requestOrigin: string;
payload: Record<string, unknown>;
}) => Promise<void>;
/** Cancels a pending browser step. */
cancelInteraction?: (request: {
userId: string;
hostId?: number;
requestId?: string;
}) => void | Promise<void>;
}
/**
* Who a login method says the user is. Core finds or provisions the user,
* runs second factors and issues the session; a method never does.
*/
export type PluginVerifiedIdentity =
| {
kind: "user";
userId: string;
/** The method already proved a second factor (a verified passkey). */
mfaSatisfied?: boolean;
/** Password logins unlock the user's data key with it. */
password?: string;
/** Redirect methods: where the browser goes back to. */
returnTo?: string;
rememberMe?: boolean;
}
| {
kind: "external";
/** Stable provider id, e.g. an SSO provider row id. */
provider: string;
/** The provider's id for the user. At most 255 characters. */
subject: string;
email?: string | null;
name?: string | null;
groups?: string[];
/** Provider says the user is an admin (admin group, LDAP group). */
isAdmin?: boolean;
/** Allowed-users list to check before provisioning or signing in. */
allowedUsers?: string | null;
mfaSatisfied?: boolean;
/** Redirect methods: where the browser goes back to. */
returnTo?: string;
rememberMe?: boolean;
/**
* Provider groups mapped to Termix roles. Core adds the desired roles
* and removes managed roles the user no longer maps to, on every login.
* Roles outside `managed` are never touched.
*/
roles?: { desired: string[]; managed: string[] };
/**
* Stored on the session so `ctx.auth.revokeSessions` can find it later,
* for an identity provider's back-channel logout.
*/
logoutClaims?: {
providerId?: number | null;
sub?: string | null;
sid?: string | null;
};
/**
* The identifier a 2.8 install kept for the user. Only for a plugin
* that took over a 2.8 login method: core also checks `identifier`
* against `allowedUsers`. `providerRowId` is no longer read.
*/
legacy?: { identifier: string; providerRowId?: number | null };
/**
* The key this attempt was counted under with
* `ctx.auth.loginRateLimit.recordFailure`. Cleared on success.
*/
rateLimitKey?: string;
};
/** Request shape a login method sees. Structural, like PluginRequestLike. */
export interface PluginLoginRequest {
body: Record<string, unknown>;
query: Record<string, unknown>;
headers: Record<string, unknown>;
ip?: string;
[key: string]: unknown;
}
export interface PluginLoginInstance {
/** Passed back to start/verify as instanceId, e.g. an SSO provider id. */
id: string;
label: string;
enabled: boolean;
/**
* Provider type shown to 2.8 clients by the old `GET /users/sso-providers`
* route ("oidc", "github", "google", "ldap"). Leave unset otherwise.
*/
type?: string;
/**
* Redirect methods: the login page starts this instance without a click,
* for a server that signs everyone in through one provider. The first
* instance that asks wins.
*/
autoStart?: boolean;
}
export interface PluginLoginMethod {
id: string;
labelKey: string;
icon?: string;
kind: "redirect" | "form";
/**
* True for a method that authenticates against something other than a
* password or key this server holds: SSO, an external directory, a
* federated identity provider. Governs whether the "ask for a second
* factor after external logins" admin setting applies to it. Leave unset
* for a local method (password, a passkey, a plugin's own local form).
*/
external?: boolean;
/** Enabled instances, shown on the login screen. No secrets. */
describe?: () => Promise<PluginLoginInstance[]>;
/** Redirect methods: where to send the browser. */
start?: (
request: PluginLoginRequest,
instanceId: string | null,
) => Promise<{ redirectUrl: string }>;
/** Redirect methods: the provider's callback. */
callback?: (request: PluginLoginRequest) => Promise<PluginVerifiedIdentity>;
/** Form methods: check what the user typed. */
verify?: (
request: PluginLoginRequest,
instanceId: string | null,
) => Promise<PluginVerifiedIdentity>;
}
export interface PluginSecondFactor {
id: string;
labelKey: string;
isEnrolled: (userId: string) => Promise<boolean>;
/** Anything the client needs before the user answers. */
challenge?: (userId: string) => Promise<unknown>;
/**
* True when the answer is right. Return an object to refuse with a specific
* message, for example when the factor had to be reset.
*/
verify: (
userId: string,
body: Record<string, unknown>,
) => Promise<boolean | { ok: false; error: string; code?: string }>;
/** Removes the user's enrolment. Called by the admin reset. */
reset?: (userId: string) => Promise<void>;
}
/** A login core is about to turn into a session. */
export interface PluginAuthPolicyInput {
userId: string;
/** Login method id, `"proxy"` for a trusted proxy login. */
methodId: string;
/** The method signs in through an outside identity provider (SSO, LDAP). */
external: boolean;
deviceType: "web" | "desktop" | "mobile";
/** The device passed a second factor before and was remembered. */
trustedDevice: boolean;
/** The method itself proved a second factor, like a verified passkey. */
mfaSatisfied: boolean;
/** Every second factor core has, and whether this user set it up. */
secondFactors: { id: string; pluginId: string; enrolled: boolean }[];
}
export interface PluginAuthPolicyDecision {
/** False turns remember me off and ignores remembered devices. */
allowRememberDevice?: boolean;
/** Caps how long the session lasts. */
maxSessionSeconds?: number;
/** Ends the session after this many seconds without a request. */
idleTimeoutSeconds?: number;
/**
* Requires a second factor even for users who have none: they get a
* session that can only set one up. `"new-device"` skips it on a
* remembered device.
*/
secondFactor?: "always" | "new-device";
}
/**
* Login rules from a plugin. Core asks every provider and the strictest
* answer wins. A provider that throws refuses the login.
*/
export interface PluginAuthPolicyProvider {
evaluate: (
input: PluginAuthPolicyInput,
) => PluginAuthPolicyDecision | Promise<PluginAuthPolicyDecision>;
/** Whether the login page should offer remember me. */
allowRememberDevice?: () => boolean;
}
export interface PluginAuthPolicyApi {
/** Needs auth:policy. Removed on deactivate. */
provide: (provider: PluginAuthPolicyProvider) => () => void;
}
export interface PluginUserTokenOptions {
/** Why the token exists, kept in the audit log and on the session. */
purpose: string;
/** Seconds until it expires. Defaults to 300 and is capped at 900. */
ttlSeconds?: number;
}
export interface PluginUserToken {
/** Send as `Authorization: Bearer <token>` to core's own API. */
token: string;
/** ISO time the session ends. */
expiresAt: string;
}
/**
* Login methods, second factors and SSH auth types. Every register call needs
* auth:provide and a matching contributes.auth entry, and is undone on
* deactivate. Core owns sessions: a method returns an identity and core does
* the rest.
*/
export interface PluginAuth {
registerSshAuthProvider: (provider: PluginSshAuthProvider) => void;
/** A host-independent keyboard-interactive handler. */
registerKeyboardInteractiveHandler: (
handler: PluginKeyboardInteractiveHandler,
) => void;
registerLoginMethod: (method: PluginLoginMethod) => void;
registerSecondFactor: (factor: PluginSecondFactor) => void;
/**
* Marks a user as enrolled in one of this plugin's factors. Core keeps the
* row even when the plugin is gone, so it can refuse the login instead of
* skipping the factor.
*/
recordEnrollment: (userId: string, factorId: string) => Promise<void>;
removeEnrollment: (userId: string, factorId: string) => Promise<void>;
/**
* Finishes a redirect login from one of this plugin's own public routes:
* runs the registered method's `callback`, then core finds or provisions
* the user, runs second factors and redirects the browser back with a
* session, exactly like `/users/auth/<methodId>/callback`. The method must
* be one this plugin registered.
*/
completeRedirectLogin: (
methodId: string,
req: unknown,
res: unknown,
) => Promise<void>;
/**
* Revokes sessions whose login carried matching `logoutClaims`, for a
* back-channel logout. Needs `sub` or `sid`; `providerId` narrows it.
* Returns how many sessions ended.
*/
revokeSessions: (match: {
providerId?: number | null;
sub?: string | null;
sid?: string | null;
}) => Promise<number>;
/**
* Core's login rate limiter, the one password login uses. Keys are kept
* apart per plugin. Put the key in the identity's `rateLimitKey` so a
* successful login clears it.
*/
loginRateLimit: {
isLocked: (
ip: string,
key: string,
) => Promise<{ locked: boolean; remainingTime?: number }>;
recordFailure: (ip: string, key: string) => Promise<void>;
};
/**
* How many users are linked to an external identity from `provider` (the
* `provider` of the identities this plugin returns). For refusing to
* delete a provider people still sign in with.
*/
countLinkedUsers: (provider: string) => Promise<number>;
/**
* A short-lived session for an existing user, for calling core's own HTTP
* API as them from work with no request behind it, like a scheduled task
* driving the Termix CLI. The user's RBAC applies unchanged. Needs
* users:impersonate, not auth:provide, and every call is audited.
*
* The session is marked with the plugin and purpose. It cannot change the
* user's password, second factors, API keys or linked logins, so it can
* never outlive itself.
*/
issueUserToken: (
userId: string,
options: PluginUserTokenOptions,
) => Promise<PluginUserToken>;
/** Login rules: idle timeout, session length, remember me, second factors. */
policy: PluginAuthPolicyApi;
/** Second factors from every running plugin. Needs no capability. */
listSecondFactors: () => { id: string; pluginId: string }[];
}
/** What a plugin may learn about a user. Needs users:read. */
export interface PluginUsers {
/** The user's UI language, like "zh_CN", or null when they never chose one. */
getLocale: (userId: string) => Promise<string | null>;
}
export interface PluginOpenIsolatedWindowRequest {
/** http(s) only. Refused when it points anywhere else. */
url: string;
/** Isolated Electron session partition; a fresh one when omitted. */
partition?: string;
title?: string;
/** Present an invalid TLS certificate on this window's own origin only. */
ignoreCert?: boolean;
}
/**
* Opens a desktop window outside the main renderer, for a target a plugin
* does not want sharing Termix's own session (a tunnelled or direct web UI).
* Electron only: rejects when the server is not running embedded in the
* desktop app. Needs desktop:window.
*/
/**
* A host to open in the operating system's own client for a protocol. The
* desktop app supports "rdp" (mstsc on Windows) today; any other protocol is
* refused.
*/
export interface PluginExternalClientRequest {
protocol: string;
host: string;
port?: number;
username?: string;
domain?: string;
}
export interface PluginDesktop {
openIsolatedWindow: (
request: PluginOpenIsolatedWindowRequest,
) => Promise<{ success: true }>;
/**
* Opens the operating system's own client for a protocol. The password is
* never passed; the client asks for it. Desktop app only.
*/
launchExternalClient: (
request: PluginExternalClientRequest,
) => Promise<{ success: boolean; error?: string }>;
/** Whether the server runs embedded in the desktop app, so the calls above can work. */
available: () => boolean;
/**
* The user's own machine. Only works on the desktop app's embedded backend
* and needs desktop:local; every call is audited once per plugin start.
*/
readonly local: PluginDesktopLocal;
}
export interface PluginLocalDirEntry {
name: string;
path: string;
type: "file" | "directory" | "link";
size: number;
modifiedTimestamp?: number;
linkTarget?: string;
hidden: boolean;
}
export interface PluginLocalWalkResult {
files: Array<{ localPath: string; relativePath: string; size: number }>;
emptyDirs: string[];
totalBytes: number;
}
export interface PluginLocalPty {
readonly pid: number;
/** The shell program that was started. */
readonly shell: string;
write: (data: string) => void;
resize: (cols: number, rows: number) => void;
kill: () => void;
onData: (handler: (data: string) => void) => () => void;
onExit: (handler: (exitCode: number) => void) => () => void;
}
/** A download being written next to its final name, published when done. */
export interface PluginLocalDownload {
/** Final path inside the chosen folder, links inside it already refused. */
readonly path: string;
readonly stream: NodeJS.WritableStream;
/** Moves the finished partial onto its final name. */
publish: (options?: { overwrite?: boolean }) => Promise<string>;
/** Removes the partial file. Safe to call after publish. */
abort: () => Promise<void>;
}
export interface PluginLocalResponse {
readonly status: number;
readonly ok: boolean;
readonly headers: { get: (name: string) => string | null };
/** A web stream of the body, or null when there is none. */
readonly body: AsyncIterable<Uint8Array> | null;
text: () => Promise<string>;
}
export interface PluginDesktopLocal {
/** Whether local access is possible: embedded backend and capability granted. */
available: () => boolean;
/**
* Calls this plugin's own HTTP routes on the embedded backend ("local") or
* on the server the desktop is linked to ("remote"), as the acting user.
* The path is under /plugin-api/<this plugin id>; nothing else is
* reachable. The link's proxy headers and certificate rules apply. A body
* may be a string, a buffer or a Node stream.
*/
pluginFetch: (
origin: "local" | "remote",
subPath: string,
init?: {
method?: string;
headers?: Record<string, string>;
body?: string | Buffer | NodeJS.ReadableStream;
signal?: AbortSignal;
},
) => Promise<PluginLocalResponse>;
info: () => Promise<{
home: string;
separator: string;
platform: NodeJS.Platform;
/** The desktop app's user data folder. */
userDataDir: string;
/** The port the embedded backend listens on. */
backendPort: number;
/** The server this desktop is linked to, or null. */
link: {
serverUrl: string;
token: string | null;
/**
* Headers for a request to the linked server: the session, plus the
* proxy headers and basic auth the link was set up with.
*/
headers: Record<string, string>;
/** The link accepts a self-signed certificate. */
allowInvalidCertificate: boolean;
} | null;
}>;
/**
* GET a JSON route on the linked server with the link's session, proxy
* headers and certificate rules. Rejects with an error whose `kind` is
* "signed_out" when the server refused the session.
*/
linkJson: (pathname: string) => Promise<unknown>;
readonly fs: {
list: (dirPath: string) => Promise<{
path: string;
parent: string | null;
entries: PluginLocalDirEntry[];
}>;
mkdir: (parentPath: string, name: string) => Promise<string>;
createFile: (parentPath: string, name: string) => Promise<string>;
/** Renames inside the same folder; never replaces an existing name. */
rename: (path: string, newName: string) => Promise<string>;
/** Creates a folder; with rootPath it must stay inside that folder. */
ensureDir: (dirPath: string, rootPath?: string) => Promise<string>;
/** Which of the given paths exist. */
exists: (paths: string[]) => Promise<string[]>;
walk: (rootPaths: string[]) => Promise<PluginLocalWalkResult>;
/** Sends entries to the operating system's trash. */
trash: (paths: string[]) => Promise<{
trashed: number;
failed: Array<{ path: string; error: string }>;
}>;
reveal: (path: string) => Promise<void>;
open: (path: string) => Promise<void>;
openRead: (path: string) => Promise<{
stream: NodeJS.ReadableStream;
size: number;
}>;
openDownload: (options: {
rootPath: string;
destPath: string;
transferId: string;
overwrite?: boolean;
}) => Promise<PluginLocalDownload>;
};
readonly pty: {
spawn: (options?: {
cols?: number;
rows?: number;
/** "wsl" on Windows starts WSL instead of PowerShell. */
shell?: string;
}) => Promise<PluginLocalPty>;
};
}
/**
* A host protocol whose login core keeps next to the host: any id a plugin
* declares in contributes.protocols.
*/
export type PluginHostProtocol = string;
/**
* What a plugin needs to hand a host's protocol login to something core
* does not run (guacd): the address and the plaintext credentials the acting
* user is allowed to use. A shared recipient gets the owner's shared
* snapshot or their own override, never the owner's raw secret.
*/
export interface PluginProtocolTarget {
host: {
id: number;
name: string | null;
ip: string;
/** The host's SSH port, the old fallback when no protocol port is set. */
port: number;
ownerUserId: string;
jumpHosts: Array<{ hostId: number }>;
};
/** True when the acting user is not the owner. */
shared: boolean;
auth: {
/** "direct", "credential", or "none" when the user is asked at connect time. */
authType: string;
username: string;
password: string;
/** The protocol's declared credentialFields, secret ones included; "" when unset. */
fields: Record<string, string>;
};
}
/** One of the acting user's saved SSH key credentials, public half only. */
export interface PluginSshKeyCredential {
id: number;
name: string;
username: string | null;
/** "<type> <base64>", derived from the private key when none was stored. Null when it cannot be. */
publicKey: string | null;
}
/** A saved credential without its secrets. */
export interface PluginCredentialSummary {
id: number;
name: string;
username: string | null;
authType: string;
folder: string | null;
}
/** A key pair to save as a new credential for the acting user. */
export interface PluginSshKeyCredentialInput {
name: string;
description?: string;
username?: string | null;
privateKey: string;
publicKey: string;
/** The key's algorithm token, such as "ssh-ed25519". */
keyType: string;
}
/**
* Plaintext host credentials, for a plugin that has to hand them to another
* program. Needs credentials:read, and every call is audited.
*/
export interface PluginCredentials {
/**
* The acting user's own SSH key credentials, without any private material.
* Needs credentials:use and the core credentials.view permission. Audited.
*/
listSshKeys: () => Promise<PluginSshKeyCredential[]>;
/**
* The acting user's own credentials by name, with no secret material, so a
* plugin can point a host at one. Needs credentials:use and the core
* credentials.view permission. Audited.
*/
list: () => Promise<PluginCredentialSummary[]>;
/**
* Saves a key pair as a new encrypted credential owned by the acting user
* and returns its id. Needs credentials:write, the core credentials.create
* permission and an unlocked data key. Audited.
*/
createSshKey: (input: PluginSshKeyCredentialInput) => Promise<{ id: number }>;
/**
* The host's login for one of this plugin's own contributes.protocols.
* Null when the host does not exist or the acting user cannot connect to
* it. Needs credentials:read. Audited.
*/
resolveHostProtocol: (
hostId: number,
protocol: PluginHostProtocol,
) => Promise<PluginProtocolTarget | null>;
/**
* Registers this plugin as the resolver for "<scheme>://..." references in
* a host's secret fields (secret-sources registers "op" for
* "op://vault/item/field"). Needs auth:provide, like registerSshAuthProvider.
*
* `resolve` runs once per host resolution, for the user the field's owner
* resolves as (the host owner, or the recipient for a personal override),
* and its result is cached briefly by the connect pipeline. A scheme with no
* registered resolver fails the connect with a message naming the plugin
* that would provide it.
*/
registerSecretResolver: (
scheme: string,
resolve: (userId: string, reference: string) => Promise<string>,
) => void;
/**
* The public key line of an SSH key credential the acting user can see
* (their own, with the core credentials.view permission). Derived from the
* private key when none is stored, including a key kept behind a secret
* reference. Null when the credential is missing, is not a key, or cannot
* be read. Needs credentials:use. Audited.
*/
publicKey: (credentialId: number) => Promise<string | null>;
/**
* Replaces secret references ("op://...") in a key and its passphrase with
* the real values, for the acting user. Plain values pass through. Hands
* private key material to the plugin. Needs credentials:read. Audited.
*/
resolveKeyRefs: (
key: string,
passphrase?: string | null,
) => Promise<{ key: string; passphrase?: string }>;
}
/**
* An audit line under an action name of the plugin's choosing (an SSH login),
* for the acting user, next to the plugin_* line every privileged ctx call
* already writes.
*/
export interface PluginAudit {
record: (entry: {
action: string;
resourceType?: string;
resourceId?: string;
resourceName?: string;
details?: string;
success: boolean;
errorMessage?: string;
/**
* The HTTP request or WebSocket upgrade this happened on, for the line's
* IP address and user agent.
*/
request?: unknown;
}) => Promise<void>;
/**
* Called for every audit line core or any plugin writes, after it is
* accepted. Fire and forget: a slow or throwing handler never delays or
* fails the audited action. Lines written before the plugin started are not
* replayed; read them with list or export. Returns an unsubscribe function;
* it is also removed when the plugin deactivates. Needs audit:read.
*/
subscribe: (handler: (entry: PluginAuditEntry) => void) => () => void;
/** A page of stored lines, newest first. Needs audit:read. */
list: (options?: {
filters?: PluginAuditFilters;
limit?: number;
offset?: number;
}) => Promise<{ entries: PluginAuditEntry[]; total: number }>;
/**
* Stored lines in time order, in batches, so an export never holds the
* whole trail in memory. Needs audit:read.
*/
exportBatches: (
filters?: PluginAuditFilters,
batchSize?: number,
) => AsyncGenerator<PluginAuditEntry[]>;
}
export interface PluginAuditFilters {
userId?: string;
action?: string;
resourceType?: string;
success?: boolean;
/** ISO date-time. */
startDate?: string;
/** ISO date-time. */
endDate?: string;
}
export interface PluginAuditEntry {
/** Only on stored lines (list and export). */
id?: number;
/** ISO date-time. */
timestamp: string;
userId: string | null;
username: string;
action: string;
resourceType: string;
resourceId: string | null;
resourceName: string | null;
details: string | null;
ipAddress: string | null;
userAgent: string | null;
success: boolean;
errorMessage: string | null;
}
/** A notification channel a user set up. Its config never leaves the hub. */
export interface PluginNotificationChannel {
id: number;
name: string;
/** "webhook", "ntfy", "discord", "email", or whatever the hub supports. */
type: string;
enabled: boolean;
}
export type PluginNotificationSeverity =
"info" | "success" | "warning" | "critical";
/**
* Who receives an alert. Left out, it goes to the acting user. "admins" and
* a permission reach every user who holds it when the alert is sent.
*/
export type PluginNotificationAudience =
{ userId: string } | { permission: string } | "admins";
export interface PluginNotification {
title: string;
body?: string;
/** Defaults to "warning". */
severity?: PluginNotificationSeverity;
/**
* What kind of alert this is, "<pluginId>.<kind>" by convention, e.g.
* "acme-ssl.renewal_failed". Users route alerts to channels by it.
* Defaults to the sending plugin's id.
*/
category?: string;
audience?: PluginNotificationAudience;
/**
* Channels to deliver to on top of the recipient's own routing rules.
* Only channels the recipient owns are used.
*/
channelIds?: number[];
/** Where the alert points: a tab type to open, or an http(s) URL. */
link?: { tab?: string; url?: string };
/** While an unread alert with this key exists, repeats are dropped. */
dedupeKey?: string;
/**
* Extra fields a webhook receiver gets alongside the message. `sourceId`
* and `sourceName` name what sent it (an automation, a rule).
*/
context?: {
hostId?: number;
hostName?: string;
sourceId?: number | string;
sourceName?: string;
triggerType?: string;
value?: unknown;
threshold?: unknown;
[key: string]: unknown;
};
}
export interface PluginNotifyResult {
/** Users the alert reached. */
recipients: number;
/** Channel deliveries that succeeded, across every recipient. */
delivered: number;
failures: Array<{ channelId: number; name: string; error: string }>;
}
/**
* The plugin that stores alerts and delivers them to channels. Core resolves
* the audience and hands the hub a list of user ids; it never sees a channel.
*/
export interface PluginNotifyHub {
deliver: (input: {
/** The plugin that sent the alert. */
source: string;
recipients: string[];
notification: PluginNotification;
}) => Promise<PluginNotifyResult>;
channels: (userId: string) => Promise<PluginNotificationChannel[]>;
}
/**
* Alerts. Every plugin sends through here and the hub plugin decides where
* they land. Needs notify:send. With no hub running, send reaches nobody and
* channels answers an empty list, so callers never have to check.
*/
export interface PluginNotify {
/** The acting user's channels, without their config. Needs an actor. */
channels: () => Promise<PluginNotificationChannel[]>;
/**
* Sends an alert. With no audience it goes to the acting user, so a call
* with neither is refused. One channel failing does not stop the others.
*/
send: (notification: PluginNotification) => Promise<PluginNotifyResult>;
/**
* Makes this plugin the hub. Needs notify:hub. Only one hub runs at a time;
* a second one is refused. Revoked on deactivate.
*/
serve: (hub: PluginNotifyHub) => () => void;
}
export interface PluginFetchInit {
/** Return redirect responses without following them, or reject them (default). */
redirect?: "error" | "manual";
method?: string;
headers?: Record<string, string>;
body?: string;
/**
* Aborts the request when no response headers arrive within this long.
* Defaults to 30 seconds. A streamed body may also sit idle between chunks
* for this long, never less than 5 minutes.
*/
timeoutMs?: number;
/**
* Exact private or loopback hosts this request may reach. Everything else
* private is refused, and redirects are never followed.
*/
allowPrivateHosts?: readonly string[];
/** Aborts the request, and a streamed body, when the caller gives up. */
signal?: AbortSignal;
/**
* TLS for a private CA. `ca` trusts this PEM bundle instead of the system
* store. `rejectUnauthorized: false` skips verification, only for fetching
* a CA root by fingerprint, where the caller checks the answer itself.
*/
tls?: { ca?: string; rejectUnauthorized?: boolean };
}
/**
* Outbound HTTP through core's SSRF guard: http and https only, no embedded
* credentials, DNS pinned, private addresses refused unless listed. Needs
* network:outbound.
*/
export type PluginFetch = (
url: string,
init?: PluginFetchInit,
) => Promise<Response>;
/**
* A generic capability check, for a privileged action that has no dedicated
* ctx method to wrap it: a plugin bundling its own native dependency to touch
* hardware (a serial port, a USB device) is the first caller. Core cannot
* mediate that access the way it mediates ctx.ssh or ctx.db, so the
* capability here is a declared, reviewable, audited statement of intent
* rather than a technical gate. Running programs has its own member,
* ctx.process.
*/
export interface PluginCapabilities {
/** Whether this plugin currently holds `capability`. Not audited: for deciding whether to offer something, not for gating an action. */
has: (capability: string) => Promise<boolean>;
/** Throws PluginCapabilityError if this plugin does not hold `capability`. Audited like every guarded ctx method. */
require: (capability: string) => Promise<void>;
}
export interface PluginProcessOptions {
/** Added to a small base environment (PATH, HOME, temp, locale, proxy), never the whole server one. */
env?: Record<string, string>;
cwd?: string;
/** Kills the program with SIGKILL after this long. */
timeoutMs?: number;
}
/** A running program started with ctx.process.run. */
export interface PluginProcessHandle {
readonly pid: number | undefined;
/** Output as UTF-8 text, in the chunks it arrives in. */
onStdout: (listener: (chunk: string) => void) => void;
onStderr: (listener: (chunk: string) => void) => void;
/** Settles when the program ends, or rejects when it cannot start. */
readonly exited: Promise<{ code: number | null; signal: string | null }>;
kill: (signal?: "SIGTERM" | "SIGKILL") => void;
}
/** A program a plugin downloads and runs, pinned to one checksum. */
export interface PluginBinarySpec {
/** File name under the plugin's data dir, e.g. "opkssh-linux-amd64". */
name: string;
version: string;
/** https URL of the release asset. Redirects are followed. */
url: string;
/** Hex SHA-256 the file must have. */
sha256: string;
/**
* Absolute paths checked before downloading, such as a copy baked into the
* Docker image. Only a regular file named `name` is considered, and one
* whose checksum matches is used in place.
*/
prebuilt?: readonly string[];
}
/**
* Programs on the Termix server. Needs process:spawn. Every program still
* running is killed on deactivate.
*/
export interface PluginProcess {
/** Starts `file` with `args`, no shell. Audited. */
run: (
file: string,
args: readonly string[],
options?: PluginProcessOptions,
) => Promise<PluginProcessHandle>;
/**
* Returns the path of a verified executable: a matching prebuilt copy, the
* copy downloaded earlier, or a fresh download (which also needs
* network:outbound). Throws when the checksum does not match.
*/
ensureBinary: (spec: PluginBinarySpec) => Promise<string>;
}
/**
* Timers owned by the plugin. Every timer is cleared on deactivate, a run that
* throws is logged instead of crashing the server, and a repeating job never
* overlaps itself: a tick that arrives while the last run is still going is
* skipped. No capability needed.
*/
export interface PluginSchedule {
/** Runs `fn` every `intervalMs`. Returns a function that stops it. */
every: (
intervalMs: number,
fn: () => void | Promise<void>,
options?: {
/** Delays the first run by up to this much, so many timers spread out. */
jitterMs?: number;
/** Also run once straight away. */
runNow?: boolean;
},
) => () => void;
/** Runs `fn` once after `delayMs`. Returns a function that cancels it. */
after: (delayMs: number, fn: () => void | Promise<void>) => () => void;
}
/** The certificate core serves, read from its configured paths. */
export interface PluginTlsCertificateInfo {
subject: string;
issuer: string;
/** DNS names and IPs from the subject alternative names. */
names: string[];
notBefore: string;
notAfter: string;
/** True for core's own first-boot certificate. */
selfSigned: boolean;
/** SHA-256 fingerprint, colon separated. */
fingerprint: string;
}
export interface PluginTlsStatus {
/** Whether Termix is set up to serve HTTPS at all. */
enabled: boolean;
/** Null when there is no readable certificate. */
certificate: PluginTlsCertificateInfo | null;
/** The plugin that renews the certificate, when one is registered. */
renewal: { pluginId: string; pluginName: string } | null;
}
export interface PluginTlsReloadResult {
/** Whether the new certificate is being served now. */
applied: boolean;
message: string;
}
/**
* The server certificate. Needs system:tls, and every call is audited. Core
* owns serving it; a plugin can only replace it, reload it and answer ACME
* http-01 challenges.
*/
export interface PluginSystem {
tlsStatus: () => Promise<PluginTlsStatus>;
/**
* Replaces the served certificate and key. Throws when either does not
* parse, the certificate has expired, or the key does not match it. Does
* not reload: call reloadTls() after.
*/
writeTlsCertificate: (
certificatePem: string,
privateKeyPem: string,
) => Promise<PluginTlsCertificateInfo>;
/** Serves the certificate on disk without a restart. */
reloadTls: () => Promise<PluginTlsReloadResult>;
/**
* Answers GET /.well-known/acme-challenge/<token> with `content` until the
* returned function is called or the plugin is disabled.
*/
publishHttpChallenge: (token: string, content: string) => Promise<() => void>;
/**
* Tells core this plugin renews the certificate, so admin settings stop
* warning that nothing does. Dropped on deactivate.
*/
registerTlsRenewer: () => Promise<() => void>;
}
/** One installed plugin as ctx.plugins.list reports it. */
export interface PluginSummary {
id: string;
version: string;
source: "bundled" | "user";
/** "active" when running; anything else means it is not. */
state: string;
}
/** The installed plugins. Needs plugins:read. */
export interface PluginPlugins {
list: () => Promise<PluginSummary[]>;
}
export interface PluginContext {
readonly pluginId: string;
readonly manifest: PluginManifest;
readonly log: PluginLogger;
readonly events: PluginEvents;
readonly kv: PluginKeyValue;
readonly files: PluginFiles;
readonly db: PluginDatabase;
readonly sync: PluginSync;
readonly registry: PluginRegistry;
readonly services: PluginServices;
readonly secrets: PluginSecrets;
readonly http: PluginHttp;
readonly ws: PluginWebSockets;
readonly rbac: PluginRbac;
readonly settings: PluginSettings;
readonly disposables: PluginDisposables;
/** A generic capability check, for privileged code no ctx method wraps. */
readonly capabilities: PluginCapabilities;
/** Hosts the actor can see, and host-sharing operations. Needs hosts:read / hosts:write. */
readonly hosts: PluginHosts;
/** SSH through core's connect pipeline. Needs ssh:connect and credentials:use. */
readonly ssh: PluginSsh;
/**
* Login methods, second factors and SSH auth types. Needs auth:provide,
* except issueUserToken, which needs users:impersonate.
*/
readonly auth: PluginAuth;
/** What a plugin may learn about a user. Needs users:read. */
readonly users: PluginUsers;
/** Opens Electron windows outside the main renderer. Needs desktop:window. */
readonly desktop: PluginDesktop;
/** Host protocol credentials and the user's saved SSH keys. See PluginCredentials. */
readonly credentials: PluginCredentials;
/** Audit lines under the plugin's own action names. */
readonly audit: PluginAudit;
/** Timers that stop on deactivate. */
readonly schedule: PluginSchedule;
/** Core's notification channels. Needs notify:send. */
readonly notify: PluginNotify;
/** Outbound HTTP through core's SSRF guard. Needs network:outbound. */
readonly fetch: PluginFetch;
/** Plain reachability checks. Needs network:probe. */
readonly network: PluginNetwork;
/** Programs on the Termix server. Needs process:spawn. */
readonly process: PluginProcess;
/** The server certificate. Needs system:tls. */
readonly system: PluginSystem;
/** The installed plugins and whether each runs. Needs plugins:read. */
readonly plugins: PluginPlugins;
/**
* Runs `fn` with `userId` as the acting user, for background work that has
* no request behind it. Always audited, and every core API inside still
* applies that user's RBAC.
*
* Needs users:impersonate. That, auth.issueUserToken and a `userId` option
* on services.get or secrets.getShared are the only ways a plugin can act
* as a user it names.
*/
asUser: <T>(userId: string, fn: () => Promise<T> | T) => Promise<T>;
/** The acting user for the current call, when there is one. */
currentActor: () => string | undefined;
}
export type PluginActivate = (ctx: PluginContext) => void | Promise<void>;
export type PluginDeactivate = () => void | Promise<void>;
export interface PluginModule {
activate: PluginActivate;
deactivate?: PluginDeactivate;
}
/**
* Identity helper that gives a plugin entry its types without importing the
* runtime. Everything a plugin creates belongs inside activate: the module is
* cached by the ESM loader, so disable-then-enable re-runs activate on the
* same module object.
*/
export function definePlugin(plugin: PluginModule): PluginModule {
return plugin;
}
export type { PluginManifest } from "./manifest.js";
export type { PluginTableDefinition } from "./db.js";
export type {
PluginSettingsField,
PluginSettingsContribution,
PluginSettingsScope,
} from "./manifest.js";